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productivity, at the same time as increasing capital input to the sector. We also find that the strength 
of energy and climate policy is positively correlated with lower aggregate TFP growth.  
 
Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 
 






The Productivity Puzzle in Network Industries:  
Evidence from the Energy Sector  
EPRG Working Paper      2021 






Abstract             
What accounts for the recent widespread slowdown in the productivity in advanced economies 
has remained a puzzle. One plausible explanation has been attributable to regulation, 
particularly anti-competitive regulations and environmental regulations. This paper focuses on 
the regulated energy network sectors by undertaking three sets of analysis in examining TFP 
in a sample of OECD countries over the period 1995-2016. First, using the growth accounting 
method, we find that there is a substantial productivity puzzle for the electricity and gas sectors, 
which exhibits a lower TFP growth than the whole economy over the period, and falls post-
financial crisis. Second, we identify the impact of regulation on productivity using a panel 
regression analysis. Our findings indicate that TFP levels seem weakly explained by changes 
to the competitive environment of the energy sector. Third, we  show that energy and climate 
policy has negatively and significantly reduced energy sector productivity, at the same time as 
increasing capital input to the sector. We also find that the strength of energy and climate 
policy is positively correlated with lower aggregate TFP growth. 
 
Keywords: Total factor productivity, growth accounting, regulation, energy networks, climate 
policy  
 
JEL Classification: D24, O47, H23  
Contact v.ajayi@jbs.cam.ac.uk  
Publication  July 2020 
Financial Support Ofgem 
1 
 
The Productivity Puzzle in Network Industries:  







Energy Policy Research Group 
Judge Business School 





               
What accounts for the recent widespread slowdown in the productivity in advanced economies 
has remained a puzzle. One plausible explanation has been attributable to regulation, 
particularly anti-competitive regulations and environmental regulations. This paper focuses on 
the regulated energy network sectors by undertaking three sets of analysis in examining TFP 
in a sample of OECD countries over the period 1995-2016. First, using the growth accounting 
method, we find that there is a substantial productivity puzzle for the electricity and gas sectors, 
which exhibits a lower TFP growth than the whole economy over the period, and falls post-
financial crisis. Second, we identify the impact of regulation on productivity using a panel 
regression analysis. Our findings indicate that TFP levels seem weakly explained by changes 
to the competitive environment of the energy sector. Third, we  show that energy and climate 
policy has negatively and significantly reduced energy sector productivity, at the same time as 
increasing capital input to the sector. We also find that the strength of energy and climate policy 
is positively correlated with lower aggregate TFP growth. 
 
JEL Classification: D24, O47, H23  
Keywords: Total factor productivity, growth accounting, regulation, energy networks, climate 
policy  
 
1 The authors wish to thank the Office of Gas and Electricity Markets (Ofgem) for their initial encouragement to 
work on the productivity issue. This paper arises from the work of Ajayi et al. (2018). We also wish to thank the 
International Association for Energy Economics (IAEE) and participants at its conferences for earlier comments. 




Increases in factor productivity is one of the most important sources of economic growth and 
rising living standards. During the last couple of decades, there has been increasing attention 
paid to the apparent productivity puzzle which relates to the phenomenon whereby productivity 
- total factor productivity (TFP) and labour productivity- in almost all advanced economies is 
flatlining (and in some cases, failing), after experiencing a long period of steady growth. This 
trend has become more evident since the Global Financial Crisis of 2008 since when the TFP 
performance of many OECD countries has been extremely poor. For instance, the current 
productivity slowdown – even before the impact of COVID-19 - in the UK has so far 
culminated in productivity being 19.7 per cent lower than the pre-2008 trend path in 2018 in 
the UK, which is almost double the previous worst productivity shortfall a decade after the 
beginning of a recession (Crafts and Mills, 2020). 
 
The earlier occurrence of the productivity puzzle has produced a number of papers, with a 
particular spotlight being placed on Information and Communication Technologies (ICT) (see, 
e.g.  Jorgenson and Stiroh, 2000; Oliner and Sichel, 2000, Jorgenson et al. 2006, Corrado, et 
al., 2007).2 Some studies examine the impact of regulation and other competition enhancing 
policies on productivity growth (e.g. Nicoletti and Scarpetta, 2003). These provide evidence of 
a negative impact of the stringency of product market regulation on productivity growth in 
manufacturing industries, but not in services industries. Inklaar et al. (2008) focus on market 
services industries and find no effect of the average level of barriers to entry in services on 
productivity growth. While most network industries – such as electricity and gas - are in market 
services (Conway and Nicoletti, 2006), there is surprisingly no industry-level empirical study 
on these highly regulated industries which have witnessed significant regulatory reform to 
improve competition over the same period during which aggregate productivity has been 
slowing down. We attempt to fill this gap by focusing our study on the energy sector, more 
specifically the electricity and gas sectors3. 
 
Focusing on the energy sector suggests a further potential source of the productivity puzzle, 
namely climate related environmental policies. For instance, at the core of  the European 
 
2 It could be that productivity growth was going to generally slow down as we hit diminishing returns to 
investment and hence there is no puzzle. However our analysis goes beyond this by analysing the differential 
impacts of policies between countries. 
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Union’s agenda is the decarbonsation of it economies, which has resulted in the formulation of 
legally binding climate change and energy targets among member states, with an emphasis on 
the renewable energy and energy efficiency targets, as well as the implementation of market-
based environmental regulation on power plant installations such as the European Union 
Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS) which is the largest cap-and-trade system for carbon 
emissions worldwide (EC, 2012).  
 
As a consequence, this sector is experiencing upward cost pressures which could affect its 
performance. Specifically, large amounts of capital have been pumped into energy sectors at a 
time when demand has been falling. The energy sector is also highly regulated in the United 
States, with private electric power companies in restructured states heavily regulated by 
government agencies on different aspects of their operations such as prices charged to 
customers, budgetary processes and energy efficiency programs (Hausman and Neufeld, 2011). 
There are also many federal, states and municipal level publicly owned utilities within a 
deregulated and liberalised market for power networks run directly by the government in some 
of these countries. To a lesser extent, the natural gas supply industry has exhibited many of the 
market reform trends experienced by the electricity sector (Pollitt, 2012). 
 
Our paper follows the renewed interest in the productivity puzzle and offers a threefold 
contribution to the literature. First, we examine the productivity puzzle in the electricity and 
gas sectors by taking advantage of the new EU KLEM database which contains disaggregated 
energy sector data4. We explore the sector TFP growth trends, in a growth accounting 
framework, prior and after the global financial crisis, while paralleling this trend in the TFP 
growth patterns of the total economy for OECD countries. We also evaluate the contribution 
of inputs (capital and labour) to the growth of valued added. Second, we focus on examining 
the relationship between the level of TFP in the electricity and gas sectors and the degree of 
energy market reform and competition. We provide analysis based on sector-specific aggregate 
and dis-aggregated regulation indices. Third, we present an investigation of the effect of 
climate policies on the productivity level of the total economy and the energy sector. We 
analyse separately the impact of two types of climate policies: carbon pricing mechanisms and 
 
4 The latest release (November 2019) of the EU KLEM database run by the Vienna Institute for International 
Economic Studies (wiiw) contains data for the energy sector (electricity and gas) reported under code D. The 
previous EU KLEMS database releases (up to the 2018) have always aggregated data for the utilities sector 
(electricity, gas and water ) and reported them together under code D-E. For the new EU KLEMS data release, 
see www. euklems.eu.   
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feed-in-tariffs for renewable energy. To our knowledge, this is the first attempt at identifying 
the relationship between climate policies and the level of TFP either at the economy level or in 
the energy sector. 
 
Our findings confirm that a productivity puzzle does exist in the energy sector and in aggregate 
TFP growth, and we shed new light on the extent to which TFP levels in aggregate and in the 
energy sector are being held back by competition policy, regulatory reform and climate policy. 
Somewhat, unsurprisingly the productivity puzzle at the whole economy level in OECD 
countries would seem to at least be partly due to more ambitious environmental policy. 
 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the literature review and 
Section 3 sets out the methodologies used in the paper. Section 4 describes the data we use and 




2. Literature review 
The existing literature in the growth accounting framework has provided numerous empirical 
studies which attempt to identify the contribution of inputs and productivity to the change in 
the growth performance in advanced economies. Much research based on growth accounting 
has stressed that investment in information and communication technology explain the United 
States growth surge (Jorgenson and Stiroh, 2000; Oliner and Sichel, 2000; Ferguson and 
Wascher, 2004; Jorgenson et al. 2006 and Corrado, et al., 2007). Far smaller productivity gains 
from ICT investment account for the lagging productivity in Europe, ostensibly due to the 
insufficient investment in ICT capital (Daveri, 2002; van Ark et al., 2002; Albers and Vijselaar, 
2002 and van Ark  and Jäger, 2017.) Studies on intercontinental comparison such as Gust and 
Marquez (2002) reveal that TFP growth decelerated in most Europeans countries as well as in 
Japan but United States, Finland, Sweden, Australia, and Canada experienced a positive TFP 
growth from 1995-2000. Exploring the productivity gap between Europe and the United States, 
van Ark, et al. (2008) show that United States accelerated in productivity growth from 1.2 
percent in the 1973–1995 period to 2.3 percent from 1995 to 2006 while the continental 
European Union countries experienced a productivity growth slowdown from an annual rate 
of 2.4 percent to 1.5 percent between these two time periods.  Although differences in total 
factor growth have been proposed to account for these divergent trend growth rates, most 
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studies suggest that productivity differences have far more potential implications for per capita 
income differences across countries than differences in input accumulation.  
 
However, these ICT explanations can be traced back to the role played by high level product 
market regulations, especially in the European regulated market services (Van Ark et al., 2008 
and Miller & Atkinson, 2014). Conway et al. (2006), for instance, argue that the incentive to 
invest in ICT is stronger in countries and sectors characterized by lower regulation. As a result, 
more stringent product market regulation would be associated with lower TFP growth. Some 
evidence of this is provided by Crafts (2006), who shows that restrictive product market 
regulations, especially entry barriers, hinder technology transfer and have a negative impact on 
productivity; and links the past TFP improvement in the UK to the apparent low level of 
regulation relative to France and Germany.  Barone and Cingano (2011) also suggest that lower 
regulation increases the growth rate of value-added and productivity of manufacturing 
industries in OECD countries, and find that the differential is about 0.7–1 percentage growth 
higher in low regulation country like Canada compared to France, which is considered a highly 
regulated country.  
  
Focusing on the relative difference between regulated and unregulated sectors, Nicoletti and 
Scarpetta (2003) document a negative relationship between the stringency of product market 
regulation and TFP in the manufacturing industries. Specifically, they suggest that reduced 
entry barriers and private ownership are the two channels through which regulatory reform 
could enhance productivity gains in manufacturing, but find no such link in the regulated 
services industries. In the same vein, Inklaar et al. (2008) focuses on market services, averaged 
across industries, and find no effect of regulation on productivity growth. They provide further 
industry-specific evidence that regulations, particularly those limiting new entry, enhance 
productivity growth in regulated transport and storage services as well as post and 
telecommunications services, but not in other service industries. Bourles et al. (2013) provide 
compelling evidence that anticompetitive regulations in regulated upstream industries have 
curbed productivity growth of OECD downstream industries in the period spanning 1984-
2007.  However, Duso et al., (2019) fail to establish any significant direct effect of average 
regulation index on productivity level among the EU energy market firms.  
 
Next to changes in product market regulations, the steady strengthening of climate change 
mitigation policies observed over the last quarter century constitutes another source of 
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significant alteration to firms’ and sectors’ regulatory environment.5 Due to the nature of their 
activity, network industries have been particularly exposed to these changes, having had to 
comply with a growing number of environmental regulations (Botta and Kozluk, 2014). While 
these were initially focused on the protection of the local environment, such as in the case of 
the U.S. SO2 Program, recent years have witnessed the implementation and strengthening of 
legislation aiming at regulating global pollutants. Many OECD countries have introduced 
economy-wide or, more often, sector-level climate policies whose scope encompass the power 
and gas industries. In most countries, the power sector was among the first sectors to face 
climate change mitigation regulations.6 Hence some of these regulations, such as carbon 
pricing, have now been in place for some time, allowing for an evaluation of their impact on 
the economy and the energy sector.  
 
Much of the debate about the relationship between environmental regulation and firm 
performance dates back to the seminal work of Michael Porter (1991). Although Porter’s 
hypothesis merely suggested a relationship between environmental regulation and firm-level 
innovation, later work has described its potential implications for firm performance. Palmer et 
al. (1995) and Jaffe and Palmer (1997) were among the first to describe such implications. In 
particular, they identify two interpretations of the hypothesis with opposite implications for 
firm performance. Under one interpretation (‘weak’), environmental regulations impose 
additional constraints on firms’ optimization problem and hence are expected to weigh 
negatively on their performance but hold the potential to stimulate certain kinds of innovation.7 
Under an alternative interpretation (‘strong’), the introduction of new (and unexpected?) 
environmental regulation constitutes a shock that prompts firms to exploit previously 
unexploited profit opportunities while complying with the regulation. In this case, one expects 
environmental regulation to result in an improvement of firm performance. 
 
 
5 Such changes affect firms’ production processes, resource reallocation, capital investment, labour intensity and 
innovation incentives (Albrizio et al., 2017). This, in turn, has the potential to affect the performance of firms, 
sectors, and economies. 
6 These policies were gradually extended/introduced in new sectors. For an up to date review of existing 
Renewable Energy Targets and Policies, see REN21 (2019). A more historical perspective is provided by the 
Climate Policy Database of the New Climate Institute, 
http://climatepolicydatabase.org/index.php/Climate_Policy_Database. 
7 As noted by Jaffe and Palmer (1997) themselves, this applies to firms that do not have a comparative advantage 
in environmental compliance or firms that invested in pollution abatement technologies prior to the introduction 
of environmental regulation. Such firms would most likely benefit from the regulatory change. 
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Porter’s initial suggestion and subsequent discussions about its implications for firm innovation 
and performance stimulated substantial empirical work seeking to discuss it in a variety of 
institutional contexts. Studies investigating the ‘strong’ hypothesis focused on productivity 
(growth) whereas those exploring the weak hypothesis focused on innovation. Early studies 
focused primarily on the effect of local pollutant regulations, reflecting the policy 
developments of the time (Cohen and Tubb, 2015; Kozluk and Zipperer, 2014; Ambec et al., 
2013). Most of these studies used sector-level data and, except for Albrizio et al. (2017), were 
focused on single context and have reached opposing conclusions.8 That is, the evidence 
available from it does not allow a firm conclusion to be drawn as to the significance and 
direction of the effect of environmental regulation on firm productivity (growth). As noted in 
Ellis, Nachtigall and Venmans (2019), more recent studies have attempted to identify the effect 
of some climate policies on a number of firm/sector performance indicators. Among them, 
several focused on the relationship between carbon pricing and total factor productivity 
(Calligaris et al. (2018); Lundgren, 2015) in manufacturing sectors.  
 
None of these studies, however, focused on the energy sector and virtually all of them 
investigated the role of the EU-ETS, with only one, Commins et al. (2015), focusing on carbon 
taxes. However one might expect that the energy sector itself is more likely to exhibit the 
‘weak’ rather than the ‘strong’ Porter hypothesis given the fact that increasingly severe 
environmental regulations – especially with respect to measures to reduce energy 
consumption/output - have been directly applied to it. Energy sectors are likely to have more 
limited growth opportunities than non-energy sectors subject to environmental regulations. 
 
One study to date, Albrizio et al. (2017), has included a wider range of climate policies in the 
scope of its investigation, using an environmental policy stringency index constructed by Botta 
and Kozluk (2014). In doing so, it attempts to get around the constraint posed by the lack of 
standardised cross-country proxies for the climate policies introduced. However, the focus is 
on overall policy stringency, which includes policies aimed at reducing emissions of both local 
and global pollutants and encompasses market and non-market based policies. In other words, 
their study does not allow to disentangle the effect of climate policies specifically.  
 
 
8 See Albrizio et al. (2017) for a review of these studies. 
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This paper adds to this earlier literature in at least three ways. First, its time coverage extends 
to years following the global financial crisis, when productivity puzzle is particularly apparent 
not only in Europe but across all developed economies. Second, it focuses specifically on a 
regulated sector, the energy sector. Most studies so far have focused on multi-industry analysis, 
especially covering the manufacturing sector which uses intermediate inputs from the regulated 
industries, and have generally attributed the slowdown in productivity to insufficient 
investment in ICT and document negative impact of regulation on TFP in the sector. Finally, 
this paper presents a first attempt at investigating the effect of climate policies on the 
productivity level of the total economy and the energy sector. 
 
3. Methodology 
We follow the standard growth accounting method which measures the growth of outputs (i.e. 
GDP, value added - VA) that are explained by the growth of different inputs (such as labour, 
capital and intermediate inputs) and by an unaccounted or unexplained growth (known as 
residual)9 which represents the productivity growth. Theories about growth accounting 
methods and applications have evolved over time with some key influential studies from 
Abramovitz (1956), Solow (1957), Kendrick (1961), Jorgenson and Griliches (1967) and 
Jorgenson et al. (1987).  
 
The methodology we have used for estimating the TFP growth figures is based on Jorgenson 
et al. (1987), in line with the one used by EU KLEMS10 project (Timmer et al., 2007, Stehrer, 
et al., 2019). The production function for industry i can be written as follows: 
𝑌𝑖= 𝑓𝑖 (𝐾𝑖, 𝐿𝑖, 𝑀𝑖, 𝑇)                                                                                                       (1) 
Where Y is output, K is capital services, L is labour services, M is intermediate inputs 
(purchases from other industries), T accounts for technology indexed by time. Based on the 
assumption of constant return to scale and competitive markets11, the growth of industry level 
can be expressed as12: 
 
 
9 This is also referred as a measure of ignorance”, Abramovitz (1956).  
10 EU KLEMS stands EU level analysis for capital (K), labour (L), energy (E), materials (M) and service (S) and 
the, and the US. For the latest update of the EU KLEMS data, see www. euklems.eu. 
11 This means that the value of output is equal to the values of all inputs then 𝑃𝑌𝑌 = 𝑃𝐾𝐾+𝑃𝐿𝐿, where 
𝑃𝑌 , 𝑃𝐾 , 𝑃𝐿denote the prices of output, capital and labour.  




𝑀∆𝑙𝑛𝑀 + ṽ𝐾∆𝑙𝑛𝐾 + ṽ𝐿∆𝑙𝑛𝐿 + ∆𝑙𝑛𝐴                                                                        (2) 
  
 
Where ∆  denotes changes between periods (𝑡, 𝑡 + 1), ṽ represents two period average of the 





;       𝑣𝐿 =
𝑃𝐿𝐿
𝑃𝑦𝑌
;      𝑣𝐾 =
𝑃𝐾𝐾
𝑃𝑦𝑌
                                                                                       (3) 
 
In addition, the assumption of constant return to scale means that 𝑣𝑀 + 𝑣𝐿 + 𝑣𝐾 = 1 which 
allows the estimation of TFP growth (∆𝑙𝑛𝐴) based on the share of the observed inputs.  
 
The component ∆𝑙𝑛𝑌𝑡 from Equation 2, refers to the change of output growth, however a more 
restricted measure, such as the value added (VA) can be estimated using the same equation. In 
this case, only capital inputs and labour inputs are taken into account13. Based on Equation 1, 
value added can be represented as follows: 
 
𝑉𝐴𝑖 =  𝑓
𝑖 (𝐾𝑖, 𝐿𝑖, 𝑇)                                                                                                                                    (4)
                                                                 
Then in agreement with Equation 2, Equation 4 can be denoted as follows: 
 
∆𝑙𝑛𝑉𝐴𝑡 = ē
𝐾∆𝑙𝑛𝐾 + ē𝐿∆𝑙𝑛𝐿 + ∆𝑙𝑛𝐴                                                                                        
(5) 
 
Where   ē𝐿 =
𝑃𝐿𝐿
𝑃𝑣𝑎𝑉𝐴
  , ē𝐾 =
𝑃𝐾𝐾
𝑃𝑣𝑎𝑉𝐴
                                                                                                        (6)  
 




13 This is explained by the fact that 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑠 𝑂𝑢𝑝𝑢𝑡 (𝐺𝑂) = 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝐴𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑑 (𝑉𝐴) + 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝐼𝑛𝑝𝑢𝑡𝑠 (𝐼𝐼). 




𝐾∆𝑙𝑛𝐾 + (1 − ē𝐾)∆𝑙𝑛𝐿 + ∆𝑙𝑛𝐴                                                                           
(7)                                                             
The TFP growth estimations and discussion in this study are based on value added instead of 
gross output which means that intermediate inputs have been excluded from the TFP analysis14. 
Results from the two methods are different15, and those results from value added TFP growth 
are usually higher than those from gross output based TFP growth (van der Wiel, 1999, Oulton, 
2000). Both methods have pros and cons and the selection of one or another method may 
depend on the purpose of the productivity measure (OECD, 2001).  
 
In the second and third empirical sections of this study, we employ econometric panel 
regression while building on related empirical literature that links regulatory indices and 
climate policy with economic outcomes. To better reveal the determinants of productivity, we 
regress total factor productivity on market regulation indicators and a set of macro variables 
which capture some cross-country differences in the second analysis. We also specify the same 
model for relationship between productivity and climate policies.  To mitigate the potential 
endogeneity problems we lag all explanatory variables one year, which we do throughout our 
regressions for all variables16. The equation that we estimate is thus. 
 
           𝑌𝑖𝑡 =  𝛽𝑍𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛾𝑋𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝜂𝑖𝑡 + 𝜓𝑖𝑡 +  𝜀𝑖𝑡                                                                         (8) 
 
where 𝑌𝑖𝑡 is total factor productivity level country i, in year t, 𝑍𝑖𝑡−1 denotes either product 
market regulatory indicators measured by the OECD regulatory index (aggregate index, entry 
barriers, public ownership, vertical integration, market structure)  or climate policies such as 
price and non-price policies.  𝑋𝑖𝑡−1  is vector of country-specific macro variables (GDP per 
capita, energy consumption, energy import and renewable capacity), 𝜂𝑖𝑡 is unobserved time-




14 One of the main reasons is due to the lack of information of GO variables from the latest EU KLEMS data base.  
15 According to Cobbold (2003, p.23): “The gross output method is intended to measure disembodied 
technological change whereas the value-added based measure reflects an industry’s capacity to translate 
technical change into income and into a contribution”.  
16This approach is a based on the assumption that the lagged values of the policy are uncorrelated with the error 
terms of the regression equation. For application of this approach on TFP growth analysis, see Buccirossi et al., 




4. Data description  
In this study of productivity puzzle in network industries, we employ three categories of 
dataset. The first set of dataset comes from the new EU KLEMS Growth and Productivity 
Accounts based on the November 2019 release of the EU KLEMS database. This database is 
run by the Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies (wiiw) which incorporates the 
latest EU KLEMS update and financed by the European Commission. The latest database series 
covers measures of output, inputs and TFP growth at the industry level for all European Union 
member states, Japan and the United States. The statistical database component contains 
growth accounts and national accounts files. To build a sector level dataset for our study, we 
consider network industries - i.e. electricity & gas - and total economy for the period 1995-
2016 across 13 countries17. The growth accounts file of the EU KLEMS database offers 
information in percentage points about TFP growth data and also contains more granular 
industry-level measures of the growth of skill distribution of the labour force and a detailed 
capital input growth decomposition. Labour input growth reflects not only changes in hours 
worked, but also changes in labour composition in terms of socioeconomic dimension across 
time. Capital input growth is decomposed into five components of which two are tangible 
capital services — tangible information and communications capital (ICT) capital and tangible 
non-information and communications capital (non-ICT)—and three are intangible capital 
services— intangible research & development (R&D), intangible software and database 
(SoftDB) and intangible other intellectual property products (OIPP).  
 
The second category of dataset used in this study comes from data on regulatory reform 
variables taken from the OECD from the Product Market Regulation indicators, which are the 
indicators of regulation in energy, transport, and communication (ETCR).  They represent the 
milestones in the gradual but progressive restructuring of regulated industries and are widely 
used database to measure the effect of regulation on market outcomes (e.g. Alesina et al., 2005; 
Duso and Seldeslachts, 2011; Bourlès et al., 2013;  Duso et al, 2019)18.  We rely on regulatory 
reform variables of the energy sectors (electricity and gas sectors), with regulation indicators 
 
17 Due to the limited times series of the growth accounting data for some countries, we only focus on 13 countries 
which have sufficient data that allows for meaningful comparison across the pre-and- post financial crisis period. 
The 13 countries considered in the growth accounting section of the study are Austria, Belgium, Denmark, 
Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Netherland, Sweden,  United Kingdom and United States. 
18 Although these papers do not cover the recent regulatory reform undertaken by the countries, there is a 2018 
update of the Product Regulatory Market data which reflect the current situation in these OECD countries, but 
this version only reports the aggregate index and do not contain the sub-indicator indices.   
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covering aggregate index  as well as sub-indicators which use categorical variables as a 
measure of the degree of  public ownership, vertical integration, entry regulation and market 
structure of national energy industries in our 22 sample countries19 from 1995-201320.  These 
indicators range from 0 to 6, with 0 representing the fully open market in which entry barriers, 
public ownership, vertical integration and market structure are minimised and a score of 6 is 
given to a closed market with the most restriction to competition. The OECD expresses the 
energy market indicators for the variables as follows, a “public ownership”, ranging from 0 
(full private ownership in the production/import, transmission and supply phases) to 6 (public 
ownership for all), the variable “vertical integration”, ranging from 0 (vertical separation in all 
phases) to 6 (vertical integration for all), the variable “entry regulation”, which is a weighted 
average of legal conditions of entry in a market and is coded from 0 (free entry) to 6 (franchised 
to one firm), and the variable market structure, coded from 0 (no firm has a market share above 
50% in either the production/import, transmission or supply phase) to 6 (the same firm has a 
share above 90% for each phase)21.  Conway and Nicoletti (2006) point out that these variables 
are directly associated to underlying policies and as such are largely viewed as exogenous to 
productivity developments.  
 
We explore the impact of these variables on the level of TFP used for the econometric analysis. 
We also obtained data on industry-specific real capital stock, proxied by real gross fixed capital 
formation, expressed in national currencies at 2010 prices and publicly available in the capital 
data file of the EU KLEM database to estimate TFP using production function approach 
proposed by Levisohn and Petrin (2003). Data on gross value added, labour and material, 
proxied by intermediate input, are sourced from national accounts file of the EU KLEMS 
database. Labour is expressed in thousand number of persons employed, gross value added and 
 
19 The second and third empirical sections of the paper extend the sample countries due to the availability of a 
more detailed data across these countries on labour, capital stock and intermediate input which enable us to 
estimate the level of total factor productivity instead of using TFP growth which is limited in data coverage. 
20
 The ETCR dataset provides an annual time series from 1975 but the version of OECD Product Market 
Regulatory data containing both the aggregate indicator and the sub-indicators is not available beyond 2013. 
Hence, we used data from 1995-2013 as the EU KLEMS data starts from 1995. The Aggregate index is a 
composite regulatory indicator of energy markets at the member state measured as an average of four sub-
indicators i.e. entry barriers, public ownership, vertical integration and market structure over electricity and 
natural gas sectors. To confirm our findings, we carried out further analysis using the aggregate index in the latest 
version of the OECD Product Regulatory Market and the results of the regulatory index are quantitively similar 
in term of magnitude and the extent of significance of the estimated coefficients as reported in Table A6 of the 
appendix.    
 
21 For more details, see Conway and Nicoletti (2006). 
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material are expressed in millions of national currencies at current prices and are deflated using 
the corresponding sectors price index of gross value added (2010 = 100). The real gross value 
added,  real capital stock and real material in national currencies are then converted to dollars 
(US$) using the exchange rate from the Penn World Tables (PWT9.1).  Besides the regulatory 
variables and the standard variables of TFP level production function estimation, we added 
some macro variables such as GDP per capita obtained from the World Bank to account for 
institutional differences across these sample countries. Other macro variables included are 
electricity consumption, energy import as a share of total energy consumption and net 
renewable total capacity. These data are provided by the International Energy Agency (IEA) 
through the UK data service (IEA, 2019a, 2019b, 2019c). 
 
The last category of data comprises variables capturing the stringency of two types of climate 
policies: carbon pricing and Feed-in-Tariffs (FiTs). The economy-wide and sector-level carbon 
price data used in the models estimated below is constructed based on a dataset of sector-fuel 
level carbon prices (see Dolphin et al., 2020). Both the economy-wide and energy sector carbon 
prices are constructed as emissions-weighted averages of these sector-fuel level carbon prices 
and expressed in 2015USD/tCO2e. The economy level price therefore is an average of prices 
introduced in all sectors of the economy whereas the [energy sector] price reflects the average 
price across fuel types within that sector. This approach follows the methodology described in 
Dolphin et al. (2020). The stringency of Feed-in-Tariff policies is captured by stringency 
indices provided by the OECD (see Botta and Kozluk, 2014).  
 
5. Results & Discussion 
5.1.  Growth accounting analysis 
To facilitate comparisons of total factor productivity (TFP) in the network industries, we focus 
our statistical analysis on the electricity and gas sector, and contrast these sectors with total 
economy. The analytical period spans 1998-2016 across 13 sample countries using the growth 
accounting data from the EU KLEMS database22.  Figure. 1 shows the results of the TFP 
growth, which reflects the portion of gross value added growth not attributed to the factor 
inputs, over the sample period. With Italy being an exception, TFP growth had a positive 
contribution to the value added growth of the total economy during this entire time period. 
 
22 We annualized data to account for the fact that years of data coverage differ across countries. For example, 




However, TFP growth for the electricity and gas sectors experienced a considerable negative 
growth, particularly for countries such as Japan, United Kingdom, Italy, Sweden, Czech 
Republic, United States, France and Finland. Although countries such as Germany, the 
Netherlands, Denmark, Austria and Belgium witnessed a positive TFP growth during the 
period.  Overall, Germany experienced the largest average growth rates in electricity and gas 
sectors (1.1% p.a.), while Japan recorded, by wide margin, the least productivity growth of -
6.1% p.a. Czech Republic has the highest average productivity growth in the total economy 
(1.3% p.a.).  
 
 
Figure 1: Total Factor Productivity Growth, 1998-2016 
 
Source: EU KLEMS DATABASE, 2019. 
 
We disentangle the TFP growth results into two time periods (1998-2007 and 2008-2016) as 
shown in Figure 2. i.e. pre-and-post global financial crisis era, in order to gain more insights 
into the structural break occasioned by the crisis on total factor productivity growth.  There 
appears to be a substantial diversity of TFP growth among countries before and after the global 
financial crisis.  Looking at the TFP growth in the electricity and gas sectors, the negative TFP 
growth of Japan is particularly striking as the country experienced the largest negative growth 
in TFP growth among the sample countries, averaging -13.7% p.a., in the period after the crisis 
despite maintaining a near-zero TFP growth before the crisis. This dismal TFP growth 
performance in the Japanese electricity and gas sector is not surprising against the backdrop of 






















Electricty & gas Total economy
15 
 
of many nuclear plants and resulted in a considerable loss of electricity production, physical 
and human capital (Rafindadi & Ozturk, 2016). This event singlehandedly caused a steep TFP 
decline in the electricity and gas sector amounting to an annual productivity growth of -30% 
p.a. and -61% p.a. in 2011 and 2012 respectively23.   
 
Figure 2: Total Factor Productivity Growth, Pre and Post Financial Crisis  
 
Source: EU KLEMS DATABASE, 2019. 
 
The productivity growth in the UK has been lacklustre in the electricity and gas sectors with 
an average annual TFP growth of -0.8% p.a. observed before the 2008 crisis. The average 
annual negative productivity growth widened amid tepid productivity performance following 
the crisis, amounting to -6.0% p.a. in the electricity and gas sectors. It is also interesting to note 
that Italy recorded the largest negative growth in TFP of about -1.97% p.a. before the crisis, 
and this trend became exacerbated afterwards, culminating in a TFP growth rate of -3.92% p.a. 
This finding reinforces Italy’s economic situation as one of the worst performing economies in 
Europe. This is consistent with Morsy and Sgherri (2010) who posit that the financial crisis 
was expected to have a long-lasting  impact on Italy’s economy and the negative TFP growth 
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In the case of France, a positive average annual TFP growth was observed before the crisis in 
the electricity and gas sectors, and total economy. However, their growth trend became 
negative after the crisis, with the electricity and gas sectors having the highest productivity 
decline (-3.9% p.a.). This post-crisis development in electricity and gas sectors is also true for 
most European countries; e.g. Finland (-3.9% p.a.), with a much stronger decline for Czech 
Republic (-7.4% p.a.), and a moderate decline for Sweden (-2.8% p.a.), Austria (-1.5% p.a.), 
Netherland (-0.9% p.a.) and Belgium (-0.5% p.a.).  On the contrary, only Germany maintained 
an appreciable positive TFP growth of 1.1% after the crisis in its electricity and gas sector, 
although the productivity growth was marginally lower than its pre-crisis growth of 1.2% p.a.  
 
Indeed, despite the 2001 dotcom crisis and the financial crisis in 2008, the United States did 
not experience a negative productivity growth in the total economy in the two time periods. 
However, the productivity growth of the electricity and gas sectors was negative (-0.96% p.a.),  
perhaps due to the mix of factors such as higher prices in restructured states (Borenstein and 
Bushnell, 2015) and California's electricity crisis (Kwoka, 2008) that brought about the 
suspension of further electricity restructuring that could enhanced efficiency in the sector in 
most states. Of course, the later period saw a moderate improvement in the sectors with an 
average annual productivity growth of 0.02% p.a, arguably due to improved drilling techniques 
and increased well productivity in shale gas production (see Ikonnikova & Gülen, 2015; 
Montgomery & O’Sullivan, 2017). 
 
There has been a big debate over the sources of the post-crisis slowdown in global value added 
growth. There are usually two widely believed arguments for this development; one that it is 
traceable to a notable shortfall in capital investment, while others point to the flattening 
productivity witnessed currently. Therefore, dimensioning the growth rate of valued added into 
different components can reveal the major sources of growth. Thus, we decompose the value 
added growth into TFP growth, labour input growth and capital input growth in order to assess 
the contribution of productivity growth vis-a-visa input growth contribution to value added 
growth.   
 
Figures 3a and 3b plot the growth contributions of factor inputs and TFP to value added growth 
for the total economy and electricity & gas sectors respectively.  A cursory look at the figures 
reveals that TFP growth is the major driver of slower growth in the post-crisis period. In the 
case of total economy, Figure 3a shows that while Germany growth of value added slowed 
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from 1.9% p.a. on average per year in the period 1998-2007 to 1.1% p.a. in the period 2008-
2016, the UK growth slowed substantially more from 2.9% p.a. in the period 1998-2007 to 
only 1.0% p.a. in the period.  Nevertheless, capital input growth has remained a positive driver 
of growth in both periods for the some of the countries, especially the United Kingdom and 
Sweden where the rapid TFP growth in the pre-crisis period has been significantly depleted 
and has not witnessed any appreciable improvement since 2008, reflecting the weak total 
economy value added  growth in the post-crisis period. Hence, we find evidence that is really 
more striking between value added growth and TFP growth than with factor inputs growth. 
Thus, given the tanking global macroeconomic growth, the rapid slowdown the TFP growth 
represents a serious concern to the electricity and gas sector, and total economy of the sample 
countries.    
 
                 Figure 3a: Contributions to Growth of Value Added in Total Economy 
 
Source: EU KLEMS DATABASE, 2019. 
In the case of in the electricity and gas sectors as shown in Figure 3b, the growth rate of value 
added fell markedly in the period following the financial crisis, and this is engendered mainly 
by dwindling productivity growth, with an abrupt dip in Japan. While the share of capital input 
growth in the value added growth increased significantly in post-crisis period, especially in the 
United Kingdom, Finland, France and the Netherlands, it is astonishing to observe that the 
accumulation of capital input could not offset the negative trajectory in value added growth. 
For instance, whereas capital growth in the United Kingdom increased by almost a full 
percentage point from 3.1% p.a. from 1998-2007 to 4.1% p.a. from 2008-2016, the valued 
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rebound in value added growth relative to pre-crisis growth in was recorded in Germany, 
including Denmark and United States. Although, average annual productivity growth of 1.7% 
p.a. in the United States was still slightly higher than Germany (1.3 % p.a.) and Denmark (0.9% 
p.a.) in 2008-2016. Thus, the reduced TFP growth rate is therefore a major drag in the 
electricity and gas sectors. 
 
                 Figure 3b: Contributions to Growth of Value Added in Electricity &Gas sectors 
 
 
Source: EU KLEMS DATABASE, 2019. 
 
The slowdown in TFP growth in the electricity and gas sectors might also be caused by number 
of factors, many of them attributable to a set of global and regional (European) directives, and 
member states develop and maintain national programmes to meet those directives. For 
example, the EU emission directives prompted the 2050 decarbonisation targets by the UK 
government, which is a set a long-term GHG reduction target of 80% by 2050 compared to 
1990 levels24. This has important implications for productivity growth as these policies are 
anchored on the underlying objectives of promoting resource use efficiency and generation of 
low carbon technologies. More specifically, the national energy sector reforms in favour of the 
European energy transition programme might be associated with substantial increases in capital 
cost due to the addition of renewables and increased interconnection and lower demand as a 
result of increased energy efficiency (which itself might add capital costs). Meanwhile 
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increased renewable generation displaces fossil fuel plants and lowers wholesale prices. This 
implies higher input costs at time of lower revenues and hence lower measured TFP growth. 
  
5.1.1. Simple correlation 
The results of the descriptive analysis show important variation in the growth contribution of 
factor inputs and TFP to value added growth.  We carry out a pairwise correlation analysis to 
reveal the degree of variation of these growth contributions. The simple correlation of the 
growth contributions of factor inputs and productivity for total economy is reported in Table 
1. Both TFP and labour input growth have a positive and statistically significant correlation 
with value added growth, at 87% and 69% respectively, while capital input growth is fairly 
correlated with value added growth at about 40%. The correlation coefficient of TFP growth 
reinforces our earlier findings that TFP growth is the major driver of value added growth. Thus, 
it appears that slow-growing countries in terms of value added growth are associated with a 
lower TFP growth in the whole sample period. 
 










TFP growth 1    
Labour input growth 0.2923*** 1   
Capital input growth  0.1233* 0.3300*** 1  
Value added growth 0.8737*** 0.6882*** 0.3965*** 1 
 
Tables 2 reports the correlation of growth contributions in the electricity and gas sectors. We 
also observe that TFP growth is highly correlated with valued added growth. However, labour 
input growth have weak but significant correlation with value added growth and capital input 
growth is not significantly correlated with value added growth. Strikingly, the findings reveal 
another difference in the correlation between TFP growth and factor input growth.  While TFP 
growth is negatively correlated with capital and labour input growth in electricity and gas 
sectors, the correlation of TFP growth with input growth is positive in the total economy. These 
correlations are all the more reassuring in that the whole economy behaves as we might expect 
while electricity and gas sectors are different. 
 
Table 2:Growth Inputs, TFP & VA  correlation for electricity and gas sectors, 1998-2016 









TFP growth 1    
Labour input growth -0.2218*** 1   
Capital input growth -0.2312***        0.1487**          1  
Value added growth 0.9601***     -0.0440 0.0074 1 
 
Furthermore, Table 3 reports the correlation of TFP growth among electricity & gas sector, and 
total economy. This reveals that electricity and gas sector TFP growth has a weak but 
significant correlation with total economy’s TFP growth, underscoring the supposition that 
productivity growth in the electricity & gas sector has a tendency to behave differently from 
the total economy. 
 
Table 3:  Electricity & Gas, and Total economy TFP growth correlation 
  Electricity & Gas  Total economy 
Electricity & Gas 1   
Total economy      0.1817***  1 
 
To further illustrate the  TFP slowdown arising from the post-global financial crisis, we turn to 
price data in order to examine whether productivity growth is driven by price effect i.e. if the 
change in price index as observed in the implicit price deflator measured in national currencies 
reflects any increase in productivity growth, as well as in value added growth.  Looking at the 
correlation results, Tables 4-5 show that the price index growth is inversely correlated with 
productivity growth for the electricity and gas sectors, and the total economy. This negative 
relationship also is revealed in the correlation between the price index growth and the growth 
rate of value added. This is quite interesting as this suggests that a decrease in price occasioned 
by falling costs of inputs is associated with increasing productivity growth in the electricity 
and gas sectors, and total economy. 
 
Table 4:  TFP, Value Added & Price Indices Correlation- Total Economy, 1998-2016 
  TFP growth 
Growth rate of value 
added Price_Index growth 
TFP growth 1   
Growth rate of value added 0.8737***                          1  







Table 5:  TFP, Value Added & Price Indices Correlation- Electricity & Gas Sector, 1998-2016 
  
TFP 
growth Growth rate of value added Price_Index growth 
TFP growth 1   
Growth rate of value added 0.9601***            1  
Price Index growth -0.2514***                -0.2116*** 1 
 
The extent of the contribution of different dimensions of capital such as tangible assets (ICT 
capital and non-ICT capital) and intangible (research & development, software and database 
and other intellectual property products) to capital input growth was also examined.  Tables 
A3 shows that all capital input components i.e. both tangible and intangible capital are 
significantly associated with capital input growth in the total economy. Table A4 reports that 
only tangible capital input growth is positively and significantly associated with overall capital 
input growth, while intangible capital growth is not significantly correlated with overall capital 
input growth in electricity and gas sector25. 
 
Furthermore, we attempt to examine the past behavioural patterns of factor input growth and 
TFP growth in relation to gross value added growth by looking at historical data, especially the 
period that is not covered by our sample. Although, Tenreyro (2018) argues that the 
productivity growth slowdown seems be more pronounced in the UK following the post-crisis 
period relative to what has been experienced by other developed countries, much less 
emphasized is whether this experience is symptomatic of the past growth contribution or due 
to quality of factor inputs. Hence, we delink the growth contributions to value added growth in 
the total economy by splitting our data into pre-sample and sample period using the UK time 
series from 1970 to 2016. In the pre-sample period between 1970 and 1997, Table 6 reports 
the correlation results which show a positive relationship between TFP growth and value added 
growth while capital input growth has no significant relationship with value added growth.  
 
Table 6:  UK Market Sector Correlation, Pre-Sample Period 1970-1998 
 







TFP growth     1    
Labour contribution      0.1212 1   
Capital Contribution     -0.3805*    0.2001                   1  
Value added growth        0.7667*** 0.7207*** -0.0366 1 
 





However, in the sample period between 1998 and 2016, Table 7 reports the correlation results 
which confirm a significant positive relationship between value added growth with capital 
input growth, albeit with a stronger positive relationship with TFP growth.  Thus, the 
contemporary period points to an increasing role of capital deepening as a significant source 
of the valued added growth relative to the pre-sample period. This finding reinforces the UK 
productivity puzzle narrative that despite the fact that the U.K. economy was building sufficient 
intangibles capital post-2000, the slowdown in aggregate economy productivity still remains 
(Marrano et al., 2009). 
 
Table 7: UK Market Sector Correlation, Sample Period 1998-2016. 
 







TFP growth 1    
Labour contribution     0.3464 1   
Capital Contribution      0.4225*     0.0662              1  






5.2. Productivity and regulation  
Shedding further empirical light on the productivity puzzle following the global financial crisis, 
we observe that the rate of log total factor productivity is persistently slowing down in all the 
countries in our sample as shown in Figure. 4. We consider the relevance of regulation of the 
network industries, especially the wave of regulatory reform in energy markets, in our 
investigation of the productivity puzzle. Although regulation of network industries has huge 
economic, social and political importance, more often than not, regulation is usually associated 
with inherent trade-offs between economic and societal 
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Furthermore, insights drawn from analyses of the regulation has pointed out potential unintended 
consequences of regulatory reforms. For example, Brau et al. (2010) posit that heavily regulated 
markets may have negative welfare effects since public ownership, vertical integration and market 
entry regulation distort the allocation of resources among sectors and firms, thereby weakening 
the overall economic performance. The costs faced by existing firms face when expanding their 
productive capacity can also influence regulation (Alesina, et al., 2005).  Hence, we hypothesize 
that negative effect of regulation on the energy industries can be linked to the productivity puzzle. 
Therefore, using a panel of OECD dataset on product market regulation covering a sample of 22 
countries from 1995-2017, we examine whether and how various dimensions of product market 
regulation influences have affected the rate of log total factor productivity in the electricity and 
gas industries26.  
 
Table 8 presents the results for the productivity impact of aggregate indicators and sub-indicators 
for the energy industry. Looking at column 1, we find that the coefficient of the aggregate 
regulatory indicator has a negative effect on TFP, albeit weakly statistically different from zero.  
One plausible explanation is that not all the individual sub-indicators which are components of the 
aggregate indicator show a statistically significant relationship with productivity as reported in 
column 2. Nevertheless, the result is similar to the EU-wide energy firms study by Duso et al. 
(2019) who find a negative but not statistically significant relationship between the aggregate 
regulatory indicator and TFP. However, in column (2), there is strong evidence supporting our 
hypothesis that entry barrier regulation influences TFP. The estimated coefficient suggests that 
increased entry barriers, which reflect a degree of restriction in the opening of the energy market 
to new entrants, reduces productivity. This is also consistent with Nicoletti and Scarpetta (2003) , 
Craft (2006) and Buccirossi et al. (2013) who find that entry barriers to competition has a negative 
effect on productivity growth. Nicoletti and Scarpetta (2003) argue that increased entry barriers 
slows down the adoption of existing technologies, largely due to reduction in competitive pressures 




26We estimate total factor productivity of country i, in year t as the residual of a country-specific translog production 
function, using Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) approach. 
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Table 8: The impact of regulation on total factor productivity level for the electricity and gas 
sector 
 lnTFP lnTFP 
Variable   (1)    (2) 
   
Aggregate regulation indext-1 -0.0355*  
 (0.0213)  
Entry barriers indext-1  -0.0679*** 
  (0.0140) 
Public ownership indext-1  0.0621*** 
  (0.0226) 
Vertical integration indext-1  0.0383 
  (0.0304) 
Market structure indext-1  0.0158 
  (0.0183) 
GDP per capitat-1 0.153 0.161 
 (0.175) (0.210) 
Energy consumptiont-1 -0.902*** -0.123 
 (0.205) (0.325) 
Energy importst-1 -0.00128*** -0.000861** 
 (0.000390) (0.000394) 
Renewable capacityt-1 -0.104*** -0.149*** 
 (0.0240) (0.0270) 
Post financial crisist-1 -0.494*** -0.461*** 
 (0.0935) (0.108) 
Constant 1.880 -1.035 
 (1.564) (1.947) 
Observations 375 300 
R-squared 0.469 0.526 
Country FE YES YES 
Year FE YES YES 
Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
We find a robust evidence that increased public ownership increases the productivity level. While 
this finding is congruous with Nicoletti and Scarpetta (2003) who confirm the positive productivity 
effect of state control, it runs contrary to the commonly held view in the literature that state-owned 
energy utilities have a mixed range of objectives that can lead to lower incentives and competitive 
pressures which are likely to encourage innovation and the adoption of productivity enhancing 
improvements. This seemingly contradictory finding may be explained by the fact that various 
models of energy liberalization exist in different countries. In effect, the government can become 
an equity holder in a regulated utility. For instance, Ajayi et al. (2017) reveal that there exists a 
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mixed public-private ownership within the deregulated and liberalised markets in Scandinavian 
countries, as well as in a deregulated and partly privatized market in Germany, which are behaving 
competitively in the market. As matter of fact, Brau et al., (2010) argue that Denmark, under 
public ownership until recent years, had consumer gas prices below the EU average in most years 
which signals some high degree of competition expected to increase productivity. However, the 
estimates of the coefficient of vertical integration and market structure do not show any impact on 
productivity. 
 
Turning to the impact of macro variables, the estimates of the coefficient of GDP per capita also 
does not indicate any robust impact on productivity, which contradicts our expectation that more 
industrialized economies should experience a rise in their TFP level. Meanwhile, energy 
consumption appears to have played the most important role, in term of the magnitude of the 
estimated coefficient, as it negatively and significantly impacts productivity. This is not surprising 
as the debate about productivity level seems to be very much demand related in that a decline in 
energy consumption by the business sector might be driving TFP. Closely allied to energy 
consumption is energy import which is measured as the fraction of imported energy in total energy 
consumption. We also find that energy import has a negative and statistically significant impact 
on productivity, though relatively smaller in term of magnitude when compared with the estimates 
of energy consumption. In most developed countries, especially Europe, national energy sector 
reform has been in favour of the energy transition where renewable generation displaces fossil fuel 
plants. Our findings confirm the effect of this pattern of energy transition on productivity as the 
estimated coefficient of renewable capacity is negative and statistically significant. The results 
suggest that an addition of renewable capacity accompanied by substantial increases in capital 
cost, in the face lower wholesale prices, might lead to lower revenue and an attendant decline in 
productivity. The results of the post financial crisis lend support to the claim in the literature that 
the structural break amplifies the decrease in productivity. This result also highlights the post-
crisis productivity trend that continues to reinforce the apparent productivity puzzle. 
 
Countries differ significantly in the way in which they regulate their energy market. We account 
for country heterogeneities on the assumption that energy market regulation will affect 
productivity given that the speed and extent of these regulatory intensity are different. To explore 
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these variations, we follow the Duso et al. (2019) approach by splitting our sample into two 
subsamples i.e. high versus low regulation countries, at the median of the aggregate regulatory 
index for each sample country and year. This approach of using a sample division is 
straightforward and advantageous as it prevents the interaction of the regulatory indicators with 
arbitrarily selected macro variables that can influence TFP. Although, we use a dummy variable 
to capture the structural break associated with the global financial crisis on Table 8, we split our 
sample into two periods, before and after post financial crisis, to quantify the variation in the 
intensity of anticompetitive regulation influences on productivity over these periods, 1995-2007 
and 2008-2017. The results for the country heterogeneities are reported in Table 9. The findings 
are generally consistent with the full sample analysis in Table 8, though some notable differences 
are observed. 
 
For the regulatory intensity subsamples, the aggregate regulatory index is not significant in both 
high and low regulation samples. The results, however, show some immediate striking differences 
between the estimates of the coefficient on the entry barriers regulatory index. While the estimate 
of the coefficient on the entry barriers regulatory index is negative and has statistically significant 
influence on productivity for the high regulation countries, the estimate indicates no significant 
impact on productivity for countries with less anti-competitive regulation.  
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Table 9: The impact of regulation on total factor productivity level in the electricity and gas sector by subsamples 









Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Aggregate indext-1 0.0264  -0.00485  0.0304  -0.247***  
 (0.0248)  (0.0376)  (0.0278)  (0.0769)  
Entry barrier indext-1  -0.0734***  0.00936  -0.0503***  -0.0818 
  (0.0220)  (0.0219)  (0.0187)  (0.0562) 
Public ownership indext-1  0.0365  -0.0320  0.0751**  -0.142*** 
  (0.0292)  (0.0349)  (0.0304)  (0.0415) 
Vertical integration indext-1  0.0288  -0.0520  0.0509  -0.0126 
  (0.0400)  (0.0493)  (0.0397)  (0.113) 
Market structure indext-1  0.121***  0.0143  0.104***  -0.0300 
  (0.0336)  (0.0198)  (0.0272)  (0.0251) 
GDP per capitat-1 -1.735*** -1.556*** 0.362 0.390 -0.745*** 0.0251 -0.487 -0.401 
 (0.331) (0.555) (0.247) (0.260) (0.267) (0.381) (0.383) (0.410) 
Energy consumptiont-1 0.323 0.646 -0.0522 -0.253 -0.649** -0.371 0.631 0.361 
 (0.306) (0.537) (0.355) (0.404) (0.258) (0.431) (0.454) (0.507) 
Energy imports t-1 -0.00141*** 0.00225* 0.00128 0.00108 -0.00194*** 9.75e-05 -0.000983** -0.00246 
 (0.000328) (0.00128) (0.00188) (0.00194) (0.000580) (0.00168) (0.000409) (0.00193) 
Renewable capacityt-1 -0.000513 0.00108 0.0228 0.0426 -0.113*** -0.176*** -0.133* -0.134* 
 (0.0397) (0.0547) (0.0493) (0.0533) (0.0369) (0.0495) (0.0681) (0.0749) 
Post financial crisist-1 -0.280** -0.631*** -0.261* -0.311**     
 (0.114) (0.179) (0.133) (0.141)     
Constant 15.65*** 11.89** -4.936** -4.387* 9.936*** 0.718 3.487 3.647 
 (2.675) (4.842) (2.242) (2.387) (2.274) (3.513) (3.321) (3.531) 
Observations 199 115 176 171 243 160 132 126 
R-squared 0.606 0.738 0.557 0.556 0.276 0.409 0.444 0.489 
Country FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Thus, this implies that firms operating under stricter regulation of entry in more anticompetitive 
countries have less incentive to make investments to increase productivity.  Arguably, the 
results consistently point to entry barriers as the key constraint on productivity in the energy 
industries across the estimated models27. In contrast, we find increased market structure 
positively influencing productivity, which suggests that an increase in firm concentration in 
the market raises productivity. Results also suggest a fall in productivity for industrialized 
countries across the high regulation sample model, implying that regulation is actually stifling 
productivity in these economies as opposed to the low-regulation economies.  
 
For the pre- and post- financial crisis periods, our findings show that the impact of regulation 
on productivity over these time periods is quantitively different. For the period 1995-2007, the 
coefficient estimate on the aggregate regulatory index is not statistically different from zero. 
However, the coefficient of entry barrier still has a negative and statistically significant effect 
on productivity while vertical integration and market structure coefficient estimates are positive 
and significant. For the period 2008-2013, the result clearly demonstrates a negative and highly 
statistical significant effect of aggregate regulation on productivity as opposed to the pre-crisis 
period. The finding suggests that despite the decrease in regulatory pressure over time in energy 
industries, as many countries are embarking on a path of deregulation, anticompetitive 
regulation remains a binding constraint to productivity. Interestingly, increased state control is 
found to exert an appreciable negative impact on productivity during this period. 
Comparatively, the evidence regarding the role played by public ownership appears to be 
inconclusive as positive influence is reported for the pre-crisis period but negative impact is 
recorded for the post-crisis period. The finding contradicts the widespread perception that often 
blames product market regulations for the poor performance of the majority of industrialized 
countries over the last few decades. This somewhat points to the productivity puzzle as argued 
by Card and Freeman (2002) that while the UK ranks highly in terms of pro-market reform 






27Alesina et al, (2005) also allude to entry liberalization as the most important component of regulatory reform 




5.3. Productivity and climate policy 
This section presents a first attempt at investigating the effect of climate policies on economy 
and energy sector productivity levels. We analyse separately the impact of two types of climate 
policies: carbon pricing mechanisms and feed-in-tariffs. As in section 5.2, the parameter 
estimates reported are from the estimation of a standard OLS (panel) model. The model 
includes both panel unit and time fixed effects, accounting for unobserved unit-specific/time-
invariant and year-specific/unit-invariant effects, respectively. The number of observations 
available for each estimation is constrained by the observations available for the policy 
variables. The carbon pricing series are available through 2016 for all 22 panel countries while 
the Feed-in-Tariffs stringency variables are available through 2012 for 20 panel countries.28 
The panels are unbalanced.29 The analysis is conducted at the level of the economy (Table 10) 
and the energy sector (Table 11).  
 
Table 10 – Effect of climate policies on economy-wide productivity 
  
 
lnTFP lnTFP lnTFP lnTFP lnTFP 




    
  
0.0006 




   
   
0.002 
   
Tax rate 
   
-0.0031*** 
  




    
0.0034 
 




     
0.0018       
0.0036 
GDP per capita 0.4277*** 0.3568*** 0.4153*** 0.2088*** 0.2336***   
0.0683 0.0693 0.0675 0.0974 0.0951 
Energy consumption -0.6871*** -0.5794*** -0.6896*** -0.5727*** -0.581***   
0.0885 0.0875 0.0881 0.1167 0.1164 
Energy imports -0.0004 -0.0003 -0.0004 -0.001 -0.0009   
0.0003 0.0003 0.0003 0.0004 0.0004 
Renewable capacity -0.0868*** -0.0815*** -0.0896*** -0.0845*** -0.0829***   
0.0098 0.01 0.0098 0.019 0.019 
Post financial crisis -0.2621*** -0.2769*** -0.2595*** -0.2063*** -0.217***   
0.0372 0.038 0.0371 0.0428 0.044 
Constant 
 
No No No No No 
 
28 Data for Estonia and Luxembourg are unavailable. Note that stringency variables are available through 2015 
for some panel units.  
29 Some TFP observations are missing in some years of the sample for Estonia (1995-1999), Japan (2016).  
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Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE 
 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations (N) 454 454 454 323 323 
Adjusted R-squared 0.566 0.545 0.569 0.412 0.413 
Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
A few interesting observations emerge. First, economy level column 1 suggests that carbon 
pricing mechanisms as a whole (tax and ETS together) had a substantial negative impact on an 
economy's aggregate TFP. For every $1 increase in the average, economy-wide, price of 
carbon, the TFP decreases by 0.3%. However, interestingly, subsequent estimations at the 
economy level (columns 2 and 3) analysing the separate effects of carbon taxes and ETS 
suggest that this effect is mostly driven by the countries that introduced carbon taxes. These 
estimations show that the latter exhibits almost no effect on TFP while the effect of the former 
is statistically different from 0 and of a magnitude close to that estimated in column 1. In our 
sample, Finland, Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Slovenia, Estonia, Japan, France introduced and 
maintained a carbon tax scheme in place throughout all years in the sample. 
 
The stringency of wind and solar FiT schemes only exhibits a weak correlation with the total 
factor productivity of the economy. However, the level of installed renewable capacity, which 
was in many countries at least in part supported by these schemes, shows a strong negative 
relationship with the economy’s total factor productivity. This effect is quantitatively similar 
to that identified in section 5.2, i.e. any 1% increase in renewable installed capacity was 
associated with 0.01% decrease in TFP. 
 
There is less evidence, however, that climate policies captured by the variables used in this 
analysis had any strong impact on the TFP of the energy sector. Pricing policies seem to have 
had only a very small negative effect on the TFP of the energy sector. For every $1 increase in 
the price of CO2 emissions, the average decrease in TFP is 0.02%. The magnitude of this effect 
is, as noted at the economy level, slightly stronger for carbon taxes than emissions trading 
systems. The distribution of these estimates is such, however, that they cannot be confidently 
identified as different from 0. A similar pattern emerges for the effect of FiTs (wind and solar 
separately) on the energy sector’s TFP. Coefficient estimates for both variables are positive but 




Overall, these results do not support the hypothesis that climate policies have had a substantial 
direct impact on the productivity of the energy sector, either positive or negative. However, we 
note that an intended effect of these policies was to induce the deployment (and economic 
dispatch) of renewable energy generation capacity and that, across all estimated models, there 
is strong evidence that this deployment had a negative impact on both the economy’s and the 
energy sector’s TFP.  
 
Table 11 – Effect of climate policies on energy sector productivity 
  
lnTFP lnTFP lnTFP lnTFP lnTFP 




    
  
0.0007 




   
   
0.001 
   
Tax rate 
   
-0.0016 
  




    
0.0023 
 




     
0.0005       
0.0031 
GDP per capita  -0.0346 -0.0387 -0.0399 -0.2126* -0.197*    
0.0585 0.0587 0.0585 0.0839 0.0819 
Energy consumption -0.4296 -0.4296*** -0.4391*** -0.1623 -0.1685    
0.0737 0.0742 0.0738 0.1005 0.1002 
Energy imports -0.0009*** -0.001*** -0.0009** -0.0009* -0.0008*    
0.0003 0.0003 0.0003 0.0004 0.0004 
Renewable capacity -0.0211* -0.023** -0.0222** -0.0728*** -0.0718***    
0.0085 0.0085 0.0085 0.0164 0.0164 
Post financial crisis -0.1412*** -0.1365*** -0.1476*** -0.0155 -0.0207    
0.0323 0.0327 0.0326 0.0369 0.0379 
Constant No No No No No         
Country FE 
 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE 
 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations (N)  448 448 448 323 323 
Adjusted R-squared  0.462 0.458 0.46 0.249 0.248 




The results presented above highlight differences in the implications of climate policies at the 
economy and energy sector level. While columns 6 to 10 provide no robust evidence of a direct 
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impact of climate policies on energy sector productivity, economy-level models (1 to 5) suggest 
a negative average impact of carbon taxes on the economy’s TFP. Taken together, these two 
observations point to the possibility that the negative impact of carbon taxes on the economy’s 
productivity originated in other sectors than the energy sector. In particular, it might have 
originated in manufacturing sectors covered by carbon taxes. However, to date, virtually all 
studies have investigated the impact of the EU ETS and the few studies that have analysed the 
implications of carbon taxes for productivity. Commins et al. (2011) and Martin et al. (2014), 
focused on manufacturing sectors and came to different conclusions. This calls for further 
investigation of the role played by carbon taxes in determining manufacturing sectors’ 
productivity. 
The analysis highlights another important point: that climate policies can affect [firm, sector, 
economy] productivity through several channels. First, it can induce change in real capital 
and/or labour expenditures. As mentioned before, both carbon pricing and feed-in-tariffs have 
induced power generation utilities to invest in new renewable generation capacity.30 However, 
given the intermittent nature of power produced by these generation technologies, their 
deployment has led to little retirement of older capital stock. A larger capital stock and 
relatively stable output in the energy sector might therefore explain part of the productivity 
slow down. The negative relationship between installed renewable capacity and productivity 
identified across all models estimated lends support to this explanation and points to an indirect 
link between support for renewable generation capacity deployment and TFP, i.e. one that is 
mediated through the actual deployment of such capacity.  
Second, climate policies could induce technological improvement leading to, for example, 
enhanced operational efficiency of existing or new plants.  The strong version of the Porter 
Hypothesis posits that this would eventually lead to productivity improvements. However, 
results for the energy sector provide little support for this hypothesis in our context and results 
for economy-level models point to a negative effect of carbon taxes on productivity. Indeed, 
this seems unlikely in that higher renewables reduce utilisation of existing fossil-fuel plants, 
reducing their productivity. 
Third, we note that the productivity measure used in this study is based on value added, which 
is sensitive to variations in output prices. Since, carbon pricing policies aim at raising the cost 
 
30 Alongside these two policies, Renewable Energy targets forced utilities to invest heavily in the deployment of renewable electricity 
generation capacity.   
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of polluting inputs to (or polluting by-products of) the production process, there is at least the 
theoretical possibility that some of the variation in output price resulting from such policies 
will be accounted for as a change in productivity (Lutz, 2016). The extent of this effect at the 
firm or industry level depends on the pass-through rate and pollution intensity. In the energy 
sector, there is some evidence that emissions costs are passed through to electricity prices by 
utilities (e.g. Fabra & Reguant, 2014), which would imply that some of the energy sector value 
added was not lost.31 The question remains as to whether higher RES by depressing gas and 
electricity prices contributed to lower measured value added and hence productivity growth. 
Finally, we emphasise that these results are obtained at the sectoral and economy level and that 
that the dynamics uncovered at the industry-level may be affected by resource reallocation 
among firms (Albrizio et al., 2017). Therefore, investigating the relationship between climate 
policies and productivity at the firm level should provide additional insights.  
 
6. Conclusion 
We have undertaken three sets of analysis in this paper examining TFP in a sample of OECD 
countries over the period 1995-2016. 
 
The first looked at TFP growth in the whole economy and in the electricity and gas sectors. We 
investigated the correlations between the various productivity measures and their components 
over time. The second focused on explaining the level of TFP in the electricity and gas sector 
with respect to energy market reform and competition. The third focused on relating the level 
of TFP in both the whole economy and the electricity and gas sector to climate and energy 
policy, as measured by carbon pricing and renewables policies (i.e. Feed-in Tariffs). 
 
We find that there is a substantial productivity puzzle for the electricity and gas sectors 
specifically. TFP growth is lower in electricity and gas than in the economy as a whole and 
falls post-financial crisis. TFP levels can only be weakly explained by changes to the 
competitive environment of the energy sector. However, more importantly we find evidence 
that energy and climate policy has negatively and significantly reduced energy sector 
productivity, at the same time as increasing capital input to the sector. Further, we find that the 
 
31 A more recent development with the potential to raise marginal cost is the increasing scarcity of suitable sites 
for utility-scale renewable power generation installation (Lancker and Quaas, 2019). 
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strength of energy and climate policy is positively correlated with slower overall TFP. 
 
The results of our analysis have important policy implications. 
 
First, the productivity puzzle does exist in the energy network sectors, particularly in electricity 
and gas. If anything there is more of a productivity puzzle in the electricity and gas sectors than 
in the whole economy. We clearly show that in spite of large amounts of capital being put into 
these sectors, TFP has fallen. This is worthy of further study. 
 
Second, the productivity puzzle at the whole economy level in OECD countries would seem to 
at least be partly due to more ambitious environmental policy. Hence environmental policies 
need to pay more attention to their impact on productivity both within the electricity and gas 
sectors but also across the whole economy. 
 
Third, we do not find evidence for ‘green growth’ arising from more stringent and more input 
intensive environmental and renewables policies. Such policies bring welfare benefits in terms 
of a cleaner environment but they do not show up in current measures of TFP. Advocates for 
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Table A1:  Electricity & Gas, and Total Economy TFP growth correlation, 1998-2007 
    
  E&G  Total economy 
E&G 1   




Table A2:  Electricity & Gas, and Total Economy TFP growth correlation, 2008-2016 
    
  E&G  Total economy 
E&G      1   
Total economy 0.1073  1 
 
Table A3: Capital Input Growth Correlation-Total Economy 
  IntangOIPP IntangRD IntangSoftDB TangICT TangNICT 
Capital input 
growth 
IntangOIPP 1      
IntangRD 0.1271** 1     
IntangSoftDB 0.0127 -0.2971*** 1    
TangICT 0.1288** 0.1480** 0.1809*** 1   
TangNICT 0.0247 0.0764 0.1049 0.2821*** 1  
Capital input growth 0.1111* 0.2308*** 0.2793*** 0.5293*** 0.9322*** 1 
       
Table A4: Capital Input Growth Correlation- Electricity and Gas Sectors 
  IntangOIPP IntangRD IntangSoftDB TangICT TangNICT 
Capital input 
growth 
IntangOIPP 1      
IntangRD - 1     
IntangSoftDB - -0.1023 1    
TangICT - 0.0441 -0.0748 1   
TangNICT - -0.1009 -0.0044 0.1528** 1  
Capital input growth        - 0.0619 0.0240 0.3426*** 0.9673*** 1 
 
 
Table A5:  Product market regulation indices correlation 
            
  Aggregate Entry barrier Public ownership Vertical integration Market Structure 
Aggregate 1     
Entry barrier 0.8565*** 1    
Public ownership 0.7411*** 0.3827*** 1   
Vertical integration 0.7522*** 0.7345*** 0.3663*** 1  








Table A6: The impact of regulation on total factor productivity level for the electricity and gas sector, 1995-2016 
 Full Sample High regulation  Low regulation   Pre-Crisis            Post-Crisis 
    (1)     (2)      (3)     (4) (5) 
Variables lnTFP    lnTFP    lnTFP    lnTFP lnTFP 
      
Aggregate index -0.0361* 0.0312 -0.0492 -0.00304 -0.0594 
 (0.0214) (0.0291) (0.0349) (0.0286) (0.0546) 
GDP per capitat-1 0.378*** -1.246*** 0.00613 -0.213 0.0956 
 (0.140) (0.355) (0.180) (0.280) (0.228) 
Energy consumptiont-1 -0.672*** 0.229 0.203 -0.595** 0.0896 
 (0.176) (0.303) (0.242) (0.251) (0.296) 
Energy importst-1 -0.00212*** -0.00115 0.00211** -0.000834 -0.000319 
 (0.000675) (0.00100) (0.000845) (0.000942) (0.00111) 
Renewable capacityt-1 -0.100*** -0.0392 -0.0139 -0.126*** -0.107** 
 (0.0202) (0.0473) (0.0353) (0.0380) (0.0423) 
Post financial crisist-1 -0.619*** -0.480** -0.179   
 (0.0990) (0.214) (0.114)   
Constant -0.502 12.21*** -0.979 5.215** -0.512 
 (1.234) (2.899) (1.535) (2.370) (1.870) 
Observations 400 197 203 220 180 
R-squared 0.520 0.564 0.639 0.226 0.518 
Country FE YES YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES 
Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
